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NATURAL LAW AND THE PROBLEM OF POSTMODERN
EPISTEMOLOGY
Mark Liederbacht

I. INTRODUCTION

In his article Returning to Moral 'FirstThings': The NaturalLaw Tradition
and Its Contemporary Application, J. Daryl Charles made the following
provocative statement:
Natural law serves as a bridge between Christian and non-Christian
morality. In civil society, religious and nonreligious people conform
to the same ethical standard in order to be governable. A revival in
natural-law thinking, therefore, must be a highest priority for the
Christian Community as we contend in, rather than abdicate, the
public square.'
Why do I describe this statement as provocative? Two reasons. First, while
Roman Catholics have traditionally embraced natural law theology, Protestants
have been far more suspicious about certain elements of it with some even
outright denying its viability for ethics (i.e., Karl Barth). Second, great
skepticism exists among an increasingly Postmodem society that questions not
only the existence of natural law, but even the most fundamental structures of
reasoning by which, if it were real, it could be accessed.
Therefore, if Charles is correct in his claim that a revival in natural-law
thinking "must take place" to build a bridge, then at least two things have to be
addressed if there is to be a hope of actually building that bridge. First,
Catholic and Protestant Christians must identify points of common ground to
serve as a basic foundation upon which they can agree and constructively move
forward. Second, Christians in general must demonstrate why and how natural
law theory is vitally necessary for personal and public life in an increasingly
Postmodem era. While it is beyond the scope of this Article and the length of
this symposium to address either of these adequately, it is my intention in this
Article to offer some thoughts on each.

t Associate Professor of Christian Ethics, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary.
Ph.D., University of Virginia; M.A., Denver Seminary; B.S., James Madison University.
1. J. Daryl Charles, Returning to Moral "FirstThings ": The NaturalLaw Traditionand
Its ContemporaryApplication, 6 PILOsOPHIA CHRISTI 59, 75 (2004).
2. See NATURAL THEOLOGY: COMPRISING NATURE AND GRACE BY EMIL BRUNNER & REPLY
No! BY KARL BARTH (1956).
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II. DISCOVERING A STARTING POINT: THE ONTOLOGY OF LAW AND
GENERAL REVELATION

A. HistoricalGrounding of NaturalLaw
In his influential article, The Concept of NaturalLaw in Greek Thought,
Helmut Koester demonstrated that long before Christians adopted a notion of
natural law the Greeks both assumed its existence and relied upon it for social
governance.3 For example, consider the following quote by Cicero in his De
Republica:
There is a true law: right reason. It is in conformity with nature, is
diffused among all men, and is immutable and eternal; its orders
summon to duty; its prohibitions turn away from offense.... To
replace it with a contrary law is a sacrilege; failure to apply even4 one
of its provisions is forbidden, no one can abrogate it entirely.
Not only was the idea of natural law present in the Greek sources influencing
early Christian writers, David Bockmuehl and David Novak have persuasively
argued that natural law thinking was also firmly established in the Jewish
tradition that likewise influenced early Christian ideas of morality. For
example, Bockmuehl comments in Jewish Law in Gentile Churches that "the
idea of a law according to nature is well established [in Judaism] prior to Philo.
. and it suggests furthermore that Philo's development of natural law theory is
in fact indebted not only to Stoic ideas of the preceding two generations, but to
a well documented and long-standing tradition within Second Temple Judaism
itself."5 In Jewish Social Ethics, Novak argues that Natural law thinking is
necessary for the very cogency of Jewish ethical reflection because "even
though the covenant between God and Israel transcends nature, it still accepts
nature as a limit and its own precondition.... Hence [natural law] functions
as
6
a formal criterion ofjudgment within the covenant itself and its law.",
It should be no surprise then that Paul would include a discussion of natural
law in chapters one through three of the book of Romans7 that clearly indicates
a level of moral accountability present to human beings apart from the written
3. Helmut Koester, The Concept of Natural Law in Greek Thought, in RELIGIONS IN
ANTIQurrY 521-41 (Jacob Neusner ed., 1968).
4. CICERO, DE REPUBLICA bk. III, §§ 22-33.
5. MARKus BOCKMUEHL, JEWISH LAW IN GENTILE CHURCHES: HALAKHAH AND THE
BEGMING OF CHRISTIAN PUBLIC ETmcs 111 (2003).
6. DAVID NOVAK, JEWISH SOCIAL ETHIcs 15 (1992).
7. Especially Romans 2:14-15.
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laws of God. Later, St. Augustine described human existence prior to the Fall
as a period in which image bearers lived in a perfected state harmonious with
the laws of nature. That is, the universe itself was so ordered and structured in
the prelapsarian state that humans had no need for a written law. The laws of
nature-but also
God were not only present in the fabric of the universe-in
8
"imprinted on the heart of man as a seal upon wax."
While both Paul and Augustine recognized that sin marred the ability to
rightly know the moral law of God, as Augustine understood it, the natural
moral law was "the law that iniquity itself does not efface." 9 That is, perception
of the law may diminish but the law itself does not. Thus, when God gives the
written law, it is not because the natural law does not exist but because human
ability to know and perceive it is damaged. In Augustine's words: "God wrote
on the tables of the Law what men did not read in their hearts.' "
By the time the Christianized concept of natural law reached its zenith in the
writings of Thomas Aquinas, there had been a long process of thought and
integration that relied on authoritative texts that were systematized and being
interpreted into the daily life of the church." The concept of natural law
inherited from the Jews and Greeks and adopted into the Christian tradition was
not a mere accommodation to Hellenism. Rather, by the time the scholasticsand in particular Thomas Aquinas-engaged the topic, natural law thought had
been tested and tried. These trials had adapted the concept of natural law into
one that drew heavily upon the teachings of Moses in Genesis and Paul in
imbedded in a framework of scriptural
Romans and had become "thoroughly
2
and theological reflection.'
One need not look far into the Reformation tradition to see that the notion of
natural law has a rich and honored place among its foremost thinkers. For
example, regarding the natural law Luther commented:
Not an individual is there who does not realize, and who is not
forced to confess, the justice and truth of the natural law outlined in
the command, "All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men
should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them." The light ofthis
law shines in the inborn reason of all men. Did they but regard it,
what need have they of books, teacher or laws? They carry with
8. AUGUSTINE, ON THE TRINITY

bks. 14, 15,21. See also A TREATISEON GRACE AND FREE

WILL, ch. 16.
9. AUGUSTINE, CoNFEssioNs bks. 2,4,9.
AUGUSTINE, ExPOSITION ON THE PSALMS, at Psalms 57, 1.
11. JEAN PORTER, NATURAL AND DrvINE LAW: RECLAIMING THE TRADITION FOR CHRISTIAN
ETHICS 45 (1999).
10.

12. Id. at 49.
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them in the depths of their hearts a living book, fitted to teach them
fully what to do and what to 13omit, what to accept and what to reject,
and what decision to make.
Calvin likewise recognized the existence of natural law in the Institutes when
he commented:
It is a fact that the law of God which we call the moral law is
nothing else than a testimony of natural law and of that conscience
which God has engraved on the minds of men. Consequently, the
entire scheme of this equity of which we are now speaking has been
prescribed in it. Hence
this equity alone must be the goal and rule
14
and limit of all laws.
In fact, the consistency among Reformers on their recognition of the basic
reality of natural law led John T. McNeill to comment:
There is no real discontinuity between the teaching of the Reformers
and that of their predecessors with respect to natural law. Not one
of the leaders of the Reformation assails the principle. Instead, with
the possible exception of Zwingli, they all on occasion express a
quite ungrudging respect for the moral law naturally implanted in
the human heart and seek to inculcate this attitude in their readers.
Natural law is not one of the issues on which they bring the
Scholastics under criticism. With safeguards of their primary
doctrines but without conscious resistance on their part, natural law
enters into the framework of their thought and is an assumption of
their political and social teaching.... For the Reformers, as for the
Fathers, canonists, and the Scholastics, natural law stood affirmed
on the pages of Scripture.' 5
How could McNeill make such a claim? In addition to the history of natural
law thinking and how it entered in to Christianity, when one further considers
the manner in which Thomas Aquinas grounded and understood the nature of
law, McNeill's reasoning becomes even clearer.

13. Martin Luther, Sermonfor the FourthSunday afterEpiphany:Rom. 13:8-10, in 7 THE
SERMONS OF MARTIN LUTHER 73 (John Nicholas Lenker ed., 1983).
14. JOHN CALviN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION bk. IV, chap. 20, § 16 (John T.
McNeill ed., Ford Lewis Battles trans., 1960) (1559).
15. John T. McNeill, NaturalLaw in the Teaching ofthe Reformers, 27 J. OF RELIGION 168
(1946).
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B. Aquinas and NaturalLaw
A proper understanding of Aquinas' view of natural law relies upon a
recognition of the context and structural outline of the work in which his most
developed discussion on the topic exists: the Summa Theologica. Peter
Kreeft's summary is helpful:
The structural outline of the Summa Theologicais a mirror of the
structural outline of reality. It begins in God, Who is "in the
beginning." It then proceeds to the act of creation and a
consideration of creatures, centering on man, who alone is created in
the image of God. Then it moves to man's return to God through
his life of moral and religious choice, and culminates in the way or
means to that end: Christ and His Church. Thus the overall scheme
of the Summa, like that of the universe, is an exitus-redditus,an exit
from and a return to God, Who is both Alpha and Omega. God is
the ontological heart that pumps the blood of being through the
arteries of creation into the body of the universe, which wears a
receives it back through the veins of man's life of
human face, and
16
love and will.

When Thomas develops his theory of law, then, he does so within this larger
exitus-redditus context. Thomas explains that a "law is nothing else but a
dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect
community. '' 17 Thus, those laws that flow from the Ruler of the universe (God)
are those that govern all of creation according to His divine plan and will.
These laws Thomas describes as the eternal law. William E. May helpfully
explains that:
Thomas taught that all creation-the cosmos and all things within
it-is under the governance of God's intelligence. Thus, the eternal
law is the ratio or divine plan of the governance of all things insofar
as this ratio or divine plan8 exists within the mind of God himself as
the ruler of the universe.'
Therefore, the end to which the eternal law points is that which is the ultimate
good (Summon Bonum) of all things and that which will bring about ultimate
happiness (the purpose of the law). 19
16. PETER KREEFT, SUMMA OF THE SUMMA 15 (1990).
17. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I-I, q. 91, a. I (Benziger Bros. ed.,
1947) (1274), available at http://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/FP.html.
18. WILLIAM E. MAY, AN INTRODUCTION To MORAL THEOLOGY 45 (1991).
19. AQUINAS, supra note 17, pt. I-II, q. 90, a. 2.
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Regarding naturallaw, then, Aquinas argues that "it is evident that all things
partake somewhat of eternal law in so far as, namely from its being imprinted
on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and
ends., 20 Therefore, to the degree that human beings perceive elements or
portions of the eternal law and/or act according to it they are participating in it.
It is this active participation in the eternal law that Thomas describes as the
"natural law." As Charles Rice puts it,
Morality is governed by a law built into the nature of man and
knowable by reason. Man can know, through the use of his reason,
what is in accord with his nature and therefore good ....
The
natural law is a set of manufacturer's directions written into our
nature so that we can discover through reason how we ought to
act.2 1
The crucial point is that Thomas' understanding of natural law is
participation in the eternal law, not the discovery of a moral law independent
from God. For Aquinas, the ontology of law itself is directly dependent upon
the existence of God. Likewise, Aquinas clearly understood natural law as
directly dependent upon a coherence in the mind of image bearers with the
mind and plan of God. Thus, Russell Hittinger is right when he asserts that
"nowhere does Thomas define natural law in anything but theological terms." 22
In fact, in a Thomistic understanding of natural law, it is proper and right to
understand that the basic first principles of natural law (such as "good is to be
done and evil to be avoided") are a form of revelation. As J. Budziszewski
explains:
To call these first principles part of revelation is not a euphemism,
for they come from God; they are utterly dependent on his
arrangements in creation. We know them for no other reasons than
they are the divinely ordained design of the world, the divinely
ordained design of the intellect, and the divinely ordained
correspondence between them. Creation may be fallen, but it has
not been destroyed; its instructions may be resisted, but they cannot
be overthrown; the knowledge of them may be suppressed, but it

20. Id. at pt. I-I, q. 91, obj. 2.
21. CHARLES RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW: WHAT IT IS& WHY WE NEED IT 30
(rev. ed. 1999).
22. Russell Hittinger, CatholicMoral Theology, in A PRESERVING GRACE: PROTESTANTS,
CATHOLICS, AND NATURAL LAW 5 (Michael Cromartie ed., 1997) [hereinafter A PRESERVING
GRACE].
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cannot be abolished2 3
C. So Why Are EvangelicalsSo Afraid?
This point raises an important question: If natural law ought properly be
understood as a system of law embedded in the eternal law of God and which
should be seen simply as a part of general revelation, why has there been so
much reluctance to embrace it on the part of Protestants? The answer, I
believe, is largely due to how the doctrine of natural law eventually developed
in light of some of the epistemological claims of Modernity. Simply put, as the
philosophy of Descartes, Hume and Kant became accepted in Western culture,
the Premodern Christian understanding of human rationality began to decline.
The Christian view that human rationality is embedded in the created order and
directly dependent upon a coherence with the mind of God was eventually
replaced by a view of autonomy and an over-inflated view of the ability of
humans to reason and discover "truth" apart from God.
This is significant because so many of the modem preconceptions about
natural law ethics assume that what is meant by a "natural law theory" is a
system of morality that claims a moral authority in nature that is somehow
distinct from God himself. That is, there is a tendency to associate natural law
with a kind of moral rationalism that excludes any appeal to direct theological
grounds. Hugo Grotius' argument that even if God did not exist natural law
would continue to exercise its dominion and its authority over us is perhaps the
first and most poignant example of this independent form of natural law
theory.24
This, however, was clearly not the case in Premodern Christianity. In fact,
as even the earlier cursory development of Aquinas' understanding
demonstrated, his view of natural law was so dependent upon his ontological
assumptions about God and the nature of the universe that his view of natural
law would make very little sense without his direct appeals to "direct
theological grounds."
Despite this reality, Dan Westberg points out that "most Protestant ethicists
or theologians have been wary of compromise with a doctrine of moral
standards based on human nature or reason., 25 Whereas with Thomas, Luther
and Calvin their various conceptions of natural law recognized the need of a
23. J.BUDZISZEWsKi, EVANGELICALS INTHE PUBLIC SQUARE 33 (2006).
24. HUGO GRortus, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 11-13 (Francis W. Kelsey trans.,

1925). See a discussion of this in Daniel Westberg, The Reformed TraditionandNaturalLaw,
in A PRESERVING GRACE, supranote 22, at 112-13; see also JACQUES MARITAIN, NATURAL LAW:

REFLECTIONS ON THEORY AND PRACTICE 4647 (William Sweet ed., 2001).
25. Westberg, supranote 24, at 103.
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vital connection with God's eternal plan and authority, "by the nineteenth
century, natural law had become a semi-autonomous principle perceivable by
unaided reason. 26
In addition to the problem of an autonomous moral knowledge, Protestants
(and many secularists) also reacted against a phenomenon that William Edgar
describes as "deductivism." Edgar comments,
Perhaps the chief and fatal characteristic of the later natural law
presentations is the feature of deductivism. This is the assumption
that from a few clear and certain principles one can rationally
deduce a set of moral principles and convert them to civic laws, thus
claiming for the legal system a grounding in natural law.... The
decisive twentieth century rejection of naturalism in moral
philosophy and in theology by both liberals and fundamentalists
becomes more understandable when seen as a reaction to the kind of
ethics represented by the assumption of rational systems, both
Catholic and Protestant.27
As a result, Evangelical theologians are reluctant to pursue ethical theories of
natural law because there is a fear that it might ultimately detract from an
emphasis on the more perfect revelation of God via the Bible.2 8
Of course, the place of greatest disagreement regarding the doctrine of
natural law relates to epistemology and to what extent the precepts of natural
law can be known and applied. But even on this point I believe there is perhaps
less diversity between Catholic and Protestant perspectives than presumed. For
example, Aquinas comments that while the first principles of natural law are
relatively clear and discernable, "the more we descend to matters of detail, the
more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters
truth is the same in all men..., but only as to the general principles. 29 Calvin
concurs with this assessment. 30 As Westberg points out, "Calvin's view of
natural law is that the principles that can be assigned to natural law are
extremely general. Because individuals and societies3 1do not inherently have a
clear set of principles, they can easily be mistaken.",

26. William Edgar, A Response to The Reformed Tradition and Natural Law, in A
PRESERVING GRACE, supra note 22, at 124.
27. Westberg, supra note 24, at 117.
28. BUDZISZEWSKI, supra note 23, at 31.
29. AQUINAS, supra note 17, at pt. I-II, q. 94, a. 4.
30. CALvIN, supra note 24, at bk. IV, chap. 20, § 16; see also bk. II, chap. 8, § 1.
31. Westberg, supranote 24, at 106.
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The comments of Puritan Francis Turretin, one of the most influential
seventeenth-century Puritan theologians, indicate a similar perspective. He
writes,
The first principles of natural law admit of no error, as Turretin
comments that although "in these conclusion this law has been in
many ways corrupted after sin, both by natural corruption, and by
vicious custom, by which the base vices and crimes sometimes
receive the name of virtues and obtain praise ... still this does not
prevent its always remaining the same among all, as to its first
principles, and the immediate conclusions thence deduced....
Although various practical notions have been obscured after sin and
for a time even obliterated; it does not follow either that they were
entirely extinguished, or that they never existed at all. For the
commonest principle, that good should be done and evil avoided, is
unshaken in all, although in the particular conclusions and in the
determinations of that good, men may often err, because vice
deceives us under that appearance and shadow of virtue.32
Thus, it seems to me that ultimately both of these fears reflect an ignorance
of the legacy of natural law in Protestantism which has in turn "brought
discredit on the whole enterprise. 3 3 Therefore, when speaking of natural law,
perhaps the most foundational points Christians need to consider as a common
ground for engaging the public square relate to how we understand the
foundation of law and limit our claims of certainty to the most basic and
fundamental principles of natural law. When natural law is understood and
described as a system of law ontologically grounded in the eternal law of God
that provides accountability to the most basic moral principles, then the initial
predisposition against it that Protestants often bring to the discussion may well
evaporate.
III. WHY AND How NATURAL LAW THEORY IS VITAL IN THE
POSTMODERN ERA

Up to this point, I have tried to address the question of what basic common
ground might exist between Catholic and Protestant Christians that might serve

32. Francis Turretin (1623-87), one of the most influential seventeenth-century Puritan
theologians, explains a Protestant view of natural law. Francis Turretin, Is There a Natural
Law?, *5, available at http://www.marshillaudio.org/catalog/printres.asp (on file with the
Liberty University Law Review).
33. Westberg, supra note 24, at 104.
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as a starting point in a revival of natural-law thinking. I now wish to switch my.
attention and briefly discuss why and how Christians must demonstrate that
natural law theory is vitally necessary for personal and public life in an
increasingly Postmodern era.
A.

Why?
1. Perspectivism

In his Primeron Postmodernity,Stanley Grenz argues that a central premise
of Postmodern epistemology is the rejection of the idea "that language has 34a
fixed meaning connected to a fixed reality or that it unveils definitive truth.,
Based on this epistemological claim, Postmodem thinkers further assert that
universally binding truth claims (such as those discovered via natural law)
ought to be rejected because human beings are limited in their ability to
discover any transcendent or ultimate reality. Instead, the best any person can
do is view the facts and data of their environment through the perspective and
linguistic filters of their given narrative.
Based on this form of reasoning, then, the Postmodern argument asserts that
we must no longer seek transcendent meanings or attempt to discover natural
laws; rather we must seek to "deconstruct" the "mythical" conclusions about
the nature of reality and truth that are sometimes claimed because "truth does
not reside in words but in contextual and historical situations in which words
are used. 35 Put another way, a fundamental assertion of Postmodern
epistemology is the rejection of any groundfor knowing any truth outside of
self or communally derived ideas. Of course, what this also implies is "that
there is no one meaning of the world, no transcendent center to reality as a
whole. 3 6 Meaning is limited to the "language game" present within any given
narrative and thus any claim to a universally shared perspective or a "metanarrative" based on the assumption of either a created order or a shared human
reasoning process is nonsensical.
All that remains possible in terms of knowledge is the discovery of personal
"truths" and the deconstruction of any given communal narrative in order to
discover what rules and values that narrative uses to determine meaning. Any
hope for a transcendent source of authority like natural law or special revelation
dissolves into communal or personal relativism or what is sometimes described

34. STANLEY J. GRENZ, PRIMER ON POSTMODERNITY 141 (1996).
35. ROBERT E. WEBBER, ANCIENT-FUTuRE FAITH: RETHINKING
POSTMODERN WORLD 22-23 (1999).
36. GRENZ, supra note 34, at 6.
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as "Perspectivism." 37
2.

Unanchored Consciences

Of course, what this amounts to is the claim that one's personal conscience
and personal convictions (or those of the community he or she belongs to)
ought to become the chief sources of moral authority and autonomy. This idea,
of course, is rightly identified as a core value of the Postmodern worldview. In
Postmodern thinking, communities or narratives become the place where one's
values, ideas, and perceptions are shaped and where one also plays a part in
shaping the communal values, ideas and perceptions. Ultimately, the only
grounding one could appeal to for his or her personal conviction would be the
prevailing cultural perspective; a grounding that will rumble and shift with each
new set of ideas. In the final analysis, it may just prove that this perspective is
38
nothing more than a Postmodern return to Hume's ethics of sentimentalism.
Once this move is made, the erosion of any claim to universal moral norms
(and thus even the first principles of natural law) are completely undercut. The
only value that remains is the rather anemic notion of tolerance or the passive
willingness to accept anything as "true for that person." Indeed, one could say
this serves as the Golden Rule of Postmodemity. Whereas once upon a time an
ethic built on natural law theory attempted to align moral choices based on
generally revealed moral laws of nature with the mind and eternal law of God,
in a Postmodem world this ideal has degenerated into the tepid idea of people
being "true to themselves" or perhaps "true to their community." Universal
truth claims based on the eternal mind and will of God have been replaced by a
Beach Boys song: "Be True to Your School."
3.

Legal Positivism and the Specter of Nietzsche's "Will to Power"

On the level of public policy, Postmodern commitments truly do introduce
nightmarish possibilities. Once morality becomes little more than a particular
37. For this reason, all claims to absolute "Truth" should be disregarded in favor or
communal or even personal perspectives on "truth." This is the foundational premise that gives
rise to the almost incoherent idea that while something may be "true for you" it is not true for
everyone. Francis Schaeffer pointed out, somewhat ahead of his time, this move toward the
distinction between what may be described as little "t" truth and big "T"' Truth. Each
autonomous knower can have something true for him or her, but the postmodemist will argue
that one can have no certain knowledge of Truth applicable to everyone and every community.
See Francis Schaeffer's discussions of truth and what he at times referred to as "true truth" in
FRANcis SCHAEFFER, THE GOD WHO Is THERE 108-47 (1968), and in FRANCils SCHAEFFER,
ESCAPE FROM REASON 19-29 (1968).

38. It is for this reason that David Wells argues that Postmodernity is actually best
described as "hyper-modernism." See DAVID WELLS, ABoVE ALL EARTHLY Pow'Rs 48 (2005).
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narrative's public sentiment, the public law can only be promulgated in the
form of socially constructed ethical ideas relevant only to individuals or
particular communities. 39 Not only does this make international law virtually
impossible, in an increasingly"4"flat world" it pushes forward the need to find or
create a "global community.'
In addition, because the Postmodern assumptions eliminate any appeal to a
transcendent order for authority, the only weight a law can logically carry is that
which any particular narrative's government has enough might to enforce.
Stated another way, in terms of law and society, if the Postmodem
philosophical assumptions about the nature and grounding of knowledge hold,
there are only two possibilities for universal moral structure. In Postmodem
times, universal moral structures will have to come either from a Nietzschean
"will to power" in which morality is imposed by a ruler or from a form of
Hobbesian social contract theory that relies on legal positivism grounded in
nothing more than narrative specific pragmatism ala Richard Rorty. 41
In such an environment, claims to natural law are ultimately viewed as
overstated expressions of what in reality is simply a communal or narrative
specific interpretation of available data-at best. At worst, they become a false
claim to universal knowledge wrongly used to impose morally imperialistic
agendas on others who have no actual obligation to submit or accede to the
claimed demands.

39. Indeed, this is a central contention of Alasdair MacIntyre's influential After Virtue. See
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984). See also his follow up book Whose
Justice, Which Rationality. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY?

(1988) [hereinafter WHOSE JUSTICE?]. Grenz comments helpfully about this point as well when
he writes:
The postmodern worldview operates with a community-based understanding of
truth. It affirms that whatever we accept as truth and even the way we envision
truth are dependent on the community in which we participate.... Further, and
far more radically, the postmodem worldview affirms that this relativity extends
beyond our perceptions of truth to its essence: there is no absolute truth; rather,
truth is relative to the community in which we participate. On the basis of this
assumption, postmodem thinkers have given up the Enlightenment quest for any
one universal, supra-cultural, time less truth. They focus instead on what is held
to be true within a specific community. They maintain that truth consists in the
ground rules that facilitate the well-being of the community in which one
participates.
GRENZ, supra note 34, at 8.
40. The term "flat world" is taken from Thomas Friedman's widely read cultural analysis
The World is Flat. THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD ISFLAT (2006).
41. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982).
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B. How?
So how should Christians begin to demonstrate the claim that natural law
theory is vitally necessary for personal and public life in this increasingly
Postmodem era?
1. Remember the Foundation of Law
To begin, if the fundamental claim of the Premodern natural law is truethat all law is ontologically grounded in God and thus while it may be resisted
or denied, it cannot be obliterated-then J. Budziszewski's advice is right on
the money. We must remember: "there is no need to cave in to epistemological
'perspectivism'; there really is a truth, not just different points of view about
truth, and God desires to lead us into it. ' 42 Why? Because what the
Christian natural law tradition teaches us is what nonbelievers, in
fragmentary fashion, already know-whether or not they know that
they know it, whether or not they think that they know it, and even if
they would rather not know it. Viewed this way, the art of cultural
apologetic is less a matter of laying foundations than of digging up
and repairing them, less a matter of talking people into truths they
do not yet know than of dredging up what they do know but have
not acknowledged. In the words of the apostle Paul, a law is written
on the heart. In fallen humans, it is far easier to suppress than we
might wish, but it is altogether impossible to erase.43
2. Identify the Incoherence of Postmodernity
A second way Christians can demonstrate the necessity of the claim to
natural law in a Postmodem age is to simply point out the absurdity of the basic
claims of Postmodem ethics. For example, in his work The End of the Law,
Stephen Theron addressed the Postmodem value of tolerance and the
agreement to disagree about moral statements. Theron argues that while we can
take this approach, we cannot expect such a perspective to actually hold society
together unless the view on tolerance holds some hidden assumptions about
person's and their value. He writes,
In itself the stance [on tolerance] is based either upon nihilism, a
destructive lie, or upon a positive belief in human dignity with
consequent respect for personal conscience. But this already
amounts to a philosophy sufficiently positive to expose much of the
42. BuDziszEwsKj, supra note 23, at 19.
43. Id. at 37.
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cant of popular [post modem thinking] as empty self-contradiction. 44
In other words, why bother respecting another's opinion unless I assume a basic
principle of justice and value relating to that other person. The value of
tolerance itself must be grounded upon some prior form of natural law claim in
order to carry the moral weight Postmodemists want it to.
3. Be Strategic
Russell Hittinger argues that in the realm of public square it may be wise to
avoid the phrase "natural law" because its use and meaning has become
convoluted and thus the term may be counterproductive even though the
doctrine is necessary. The negative reactions to natural law that Senators
Joseph Biden and Ted Kennedy displayed at the 1991 Clarence Thomas
Supreme Court nomination hearings are a case in point. Hittinger comments,
The question is whether we should refer to the moral discourse in
this sphere as "natural law." Of course, we believe it is the natural
law that renders the gentiles amenable to the rudiments of moral
discourse... [but] the basis of moral order will not stand or' 4fall
on
5
whether, or to what extent, we use the words "natural law.
It may simply be wiser to use phrases like "foundational civic duties and laws,"
"foundational principles ofjustice," or even "basic principles of common sense
and intuition" when debating in the public square.4 6 In each case, however, the
philosophical and moral effort is founded on the underlying reality of natural
law principles.
In this way, natural law can be utilized to formulate and champion what
might best be described as a lowest common denominator (LCD) foundation of
laws that promote the common good and provide a shield in society against
laws that violate basic human dignity.4 7
4. Remember the Importance of the Gospel
Having recognized the strategic benefits of developing a LCD foundation
based on natural law reasoning, in order for these arguments to have long-term
impact in the public square we will ultimately have to address the metaphysical
and epistemological questions that swirl around the issue. The reason for this
44. STEPHEN THERON, THE END OF THE LAW 2 (1999).

45. Russell Hittinger, NaturalLaw and CatholicMoralTheology, in A PRESERVING GRACE,
supra note 22, at 28.
46. A potent example of a recent work that has successfully taken this approach is FRANCIS
BECKWITH, CHOOSING LIFE (2007).

47. For further discussion on these points see RICE, supra note 21, at 62-63.
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assertion is that while, for example, a natural law based case against abortion
may be logically sound, in a postmodem society the form of logic itself may be
questioned. Upon what basis does one claim the authority to assert that the
form of argumentation about abortion being used is the "right" form? What
would be the epistemic justification? Why is the valuation of human life a
higher order principle than autonomy? How could one be sure or know that
this form of natural law rationality is superior to another non-natural law form
of argumentation?
Without an explicit link to metaphysical/worldview foundations even the
natural law based arguments will run the risk of falling prey to
Postmodernism's denial of a perspective that transcends particular narratives.
In the words of Alasdair MacIntyre, when it comes to making public policy,
"whose justice" and "which rationality" should be used? 48 Without a more
explicit and certain apologetic to demonstrate the grounding of law, any moral
project runs the danger of being labeled as just one tradition's "vantage
point"--including the natural law perspective.
IV. CONCLUSION

Efforts to bridge the gap between Christian and non-Christian morality
through the reliance upon an LCD developed by an appeal to basic moral
principles may fall prey to an over-reliance on an assumed sentiment within a
given moral community. My point is not that we should avoid appealing to
things like our "deepest moral intuitions" or "common sense experience" as
proofs for a foundational moral order, but that when such claims serve as the
foundational authority, left alone they are in danger of losing their moral
influence. That is, if an LCD approach is not sufficiently grounded in a
transcendent metaphysical perspective, then the competing moral perspectives
are in danger of becoming little more than dueling convictions arising from
dueling consciences formed in dueling worldview commitments.
It is for this reason that at the end of the day, while natural law can indeed
serve as the "bridge between Christian and non-Christian morality" that J.
Daryl Charles believes it can, we must not lose sight of the ultimate reason for
building the bridge. The reason Christians must find common ground to build
this bridge and the reason why Postmodernity must be challenged is not first of
all so that we can achieve a moral society. Rather, as Aquinas was at pains
throughout the Summa to demonstrate, God created the universe with the
purpose of exitus et redditus. That is, all things were created by Him and for
48. WHOSE JUSTICE?, supranote 39, at 401-02.
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His glory and everything (and everyone) ought to return to Him the glory due
His name.
Even if we succeed in building a natural law bridge that enables us to
"contend in and not abdicate the public square," why should anyone be obliged
in conscience to obey the natural laws? For as Jacques Maritain rightly asserts,
"if God does not exist, the Natural Law lacks obligatory power. ' 49 Thus, while
natural law may provide the bridge Charles wants into the public square,
ultimately it is the Gospel that provides the bridge from the public square to the
Summon Bonum or highest end of human flourishing. As Charles Rice
correctly surmises, "the natural law makes no ultimate sense without God as its
author., 50 And it is God Himself-not a moral public square-that is the
Gospel.

49. MARITAIN, supra note 24, at 46-47.
50. RICE, supra note 21, at 30.
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